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1. Introduction
Financial and monetary crises have been parts of the evolution of 
economic cycles from time immemorial. Thus, for several decades 
now, the intensification of the globalisation process, particularly its 
a b s t r a c t
The ongoing globalisation process has not put an end to international financial crises. On the contrary, it 
seems to have contributed to their appearance and to accentuating their degrees of unpredictability. In this 
context, the main objective of the present study is to establish whether the values of the best-known and 
most widely used country risk indexes, namely, the Euromoney index and the International Country Risk 
Group (ICRG), and the values of their representative variables could have forecasted well in advance the crises 
that took place between 1994 and 2002, a period which is herein termed the ‘globalisation era’. The results 
show that, although the selected indexes and their representative variables were able to identify certain 
vulnerabilities, they could not accurately identify the political, economic, and/or financial factors that 
developed prior to these crisis episodes.
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La imprevisibilidad de los episodios de crisis: un análisis sobre los índices  
de riesgo país en la era de la globalización
r e s u m e n
Aunque la actual crisis muestra entre los factores causantes de su desencadenamiento ciertas propiedades 
únicas, no puede obviarse el hecho de que comparte algunas características con las crisis anteriores que se 
produjeron especialmente a partir de 1994. Y una de estas características es la imprevisibilidad.
 El objetivo del presente trabajo es contrastar si los índices más conocidos y utilizados (el índice de 
Euromoney y el ICRG) y las variables más representativas incluidas en su configuración fueron capaces de 
anticipar las crisis que tuvieron lugar entre 1994 y 2002, esto es, las crisis de la “era de la globalización”. Los 
resultados obtenidos son negativos, por lo que se concluye que el valor de los índices y el valor de las variables 
en ellos contenidas se muestran incapaces de reflejar con suficiente antelación —a medio plazo— las 
vulnerabilidades que se desarrollaron previamente al surgimiento de los episodios de crisis.
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economic aspects, has affected this relationship to the point that 
nearly all experts agree that economic globalisation has increased 
the market’s vulnerabilities. These include the volatility of key 
financial data and the uncertainty associated with economic events. 
Moreover, some experts even argue that the intensity and severity of 
these crises have increased because of the distortions resulting from 
this process.
This line of reasoning implies that globalisation has also 
heightened the unforeseeable nature of such episodes, as 
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demonstrated by the current crisis. Even though imbalances were 
causing alarm to financial authorities, neither the supervisory nor 
the multilateral entities were capable of foreseeing the form, the 
time, or the place in which they were developing, and, even less so, 
their impact on the real economy. However, this unpredictability 
does not only seem to be characteristic of the current crisis, but 
rather a common factor of previous episodes during the globalisation 
era, and that despite the existence of warning instruments, such as 
country risk indexes, credit risk ratings, or early warning systems.
The main objective of the present paper is to consider whether 
the values of the Euromoney index and International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) —the best known and most widely used country risk 
indexes in the industry— and the values of the most representative 
variables contained in them were capable of forecasting the crises 
that occurred between 1994 and 2002, which are considered to be 
the forerunners of the current crisis.
This study uses a sample of 13 countries that suffered an external 
financial crisis episode during that time interval and 50 countries 
that despite having similar financial and economic characteristics 
did not. Furthermore, we only use the results of a previous factorial 
analysis that determined which of the variables contained in each 
index are the most representative.
Based on this analysis, a logistic regression analysis is applied 
in order to establish whether or not the values of the indexes and 
the values of their most signif icant variables are capable of 
distinguishing between both groups in advance. Thus, if they 
could distinguish between any of the cases, the conjectures would 
be confirmed about their poor forecasting capacity in the medium 
term and it could be concluded that they do not ref lect the 
financial, economic, and political vulnerabilities that develop 
prior to the emergence of these crisis episodes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second 
section analyses two of the main negative consequences of the 
globalisation process: the increased volatility of the financial 
markets and the growing uncertainty and unpredictability of events. 
The third section sets out the country risk indexes considered in this 
paper: the index of the Euromoney magazine and the ICRG. The 
hypotheses put forward as well as the methodology used to compare 
them are described in the same section. The fourth section presents 
the obtained results and the fifth concludes.
2. Globalisation and the Unpredictability of Financial Crises
In any evolutionary process, moving from a local order to a more 
complex global one leads to certain disorder, which can create 
instability and tensions and even lead to conflicts (Nieto de Alba, 
2008). Furthermore, in most cases, the phenomena that emerge 
from this process do not have clear historical precedents, which 
stresses the need for an in-depth analysis in order to establish the 
reasons for their emergence and to predict their future evolution 
patterns.
A clear example of this is the globalisation process1 over recent 
decades. This complex and diverse process is linked to the growing 
economic ,  pol it ica l ,  and env ironment al  integ rat ion and 
interconnection between national economies whose impact is 
reflected in the current situation (IMF, 2002). Specifically, the most 
important changes have been caused by the globalisation of 
financial markets2 insomuch as this is where greatest progress 
1 See IMF (1998), Bordo et al. (2003), Ferreiro et al. (2007), and Rossi (2008), among 
others.
2 The globalisation of financial markets is, along with production capital and goods 
capital, one of the three types of markets tackled by economic globalisation. In general 
terms, the latter is taken to be the growing integration and interconnection between 
national economies that enables, by means of the elimination of the geographical 
frontiers for any types of flows, the more efficient use of the available resources 
(Urionabarrenetxea, 2007).
towards integration has been made (Pedrosa, 2003; Ferreiro et al., 
2007). This has been mainly driven by financial liberalisation 
processes, the development of advanced information and 
communication technologies, the creation of increasingly more 
complex and efficient financial instruments, and the increased 
involvement in the market of institutional investors, which enjoy 
better information and financial resources (Anchuelo and García, 
2009).
Thus, financial globalisation has been in the spotlight because of 
not only its extraordinary expansion but also its direct impacts on 
the markets themselves, among the parties trading on them, and on 
general economic development. Cutting costs of capital, increasing 
economic efficiency, and eliminating barriers to economic activity 
are some examples of the possible benefits of this process. However, 
in the opinion of many experts, these benefits have not managed to 
offset the threats, such as greater speculative pressures, increased 
systemic risk, and the growing vulnerability to which emerging 
economies are exposed (Fernández de Lis and Ontiveros, 2009). 
Furthermore, it is precisely among these negative aspects of 
globalisation where we f ind three related and particularly 
concerning issues (Bustelo et al., 1999; Mishkin, 2005; Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2008; De la Dehesa, 2009): the increased volatility of key 
financial data, the growing uncertainty associated with economic 
events, and their unpredictability.
Leaving on one side the lack of consensus regarding the direct 
relation between progressive financial globalisation and increased 
volatility (Kose et al., 2006), the majority of experts do agree that the 
distortions caused by the first exacerbate and increase the second 
(Hermalin and Rose, 1999, Wagner and Berger, 2004). This cause/
effect relationship occurs because of various factors: information 
asymmetries, which cause moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems; the use of increasingly more complex derivatives, which 
multiply the opportunities to speculate on international capital 
markets; and the greater stake of institutional investors, because 
this type of agent handles huge amounts of capital and has access to 
insider information (Gabaix et al., 2005; Mishkin, 2005; De la 
Dehesa, 2009; Manconi et al., 2010). Moreover, many authors note 
that the free international mobility of capital, without the relevant 
supervision and control by economic authorities, increases volatility 
(Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Stiglitz, 2004), and this, in turn, 
increases the number and severity of the crises (Bordo, 2006; 
Edwards, 2008).
The second negative effect of globalisation refers to the growing 
uncertainty faced by economic stakeholders who, forced by the need 
to internationalise, must confront the risks inherent in operating in 
unknown or little known environments. This situation has been 
aggravated by the financial crises that have occurred from Mexico 
1994/95 to the present one (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; IMF, 
2009; Torres, 2009). Furthermore, global uncertainty leads to the 
unpredictability of the events that occur in those increasingly more 
uncertain social, political, and economic settings.
Thus, volatility, uncertainty, and unpredictability are harmful, 
because the need to proceed with internationalisation and its risks 
not only affects international companies and major institutional 
investors, which tend to have the necessary resources to offset them, 
but also spreads to smaller companies, financial entities, and even 
individual investors (Hoti, 2005; Rodríguez et al., 2006).
An example of the link between the globalisation process and the 
aforementioned negative effects is the current international 
financial crisis, which can be considered to be the first ‘global crisis’. 
It started in the US halfway through 2007 as a local imbalance 
arising from the problems with sub-prime mortgages, but 
subsequently became an unprecedented recession owing to its 
severity and rapid spread (the contagion effect; Rose and Spiegel, 
2009) and to the fact that it has affected the majority of countries. 
Some authors believe that this global crisis can be defined as a set of 
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local crises (Ruiz, 2010), that has occurred as a natural consequence 
of the economic cycles3, but with the characteristic that those cycles 
are currently synchronised because of the globalisation process 
(Calderón et al., 2007; Kose et al., 2010). This explains why the 
imbalances emerged almost simultaneously throughout the global 
economy.
The development and final outbreak of the crisis is not the result 
of a single event; quite to the contrary, the majority of experts model 
this scenario using complex interactions among a large number of 
factors (De la Dehesa, 2009). Thus, the ones that are most referred to 
in the literature can be found in Young (2008), Brunnermeier (2009), 
De Gregorio (2009), De Long (2009), Feldstein (2009), Haldane 
(2009), and IMF (2009). These include the ‘macro’ context prior to 
the crisis, characterised by major global expansion that leads to the 
taking of risky decisions — also known as Great Moderation or 
feelgood factor; excessive indebtedness by financial institutions; the 
concentration of systemic risk; price bubbles; the asymmetry in the 
available information for participants; errors in measuring country 
risk; and the lack of regulation and supervision by public authorities 
and central banks. As Kane (2009) points out, those can be 
summarised as a double failure: on one hand, the very failure of the 
market and, on the other, the lack of supervision that enabled such a 
failure to occur.
Leaving the origins of the current crisis to one side, what is also of 
interest is why it was not headed off. Despite the numerous 
warnings, nobody was able to foresee the form it would take, its 
intensity, and the timing of its onset (Besley and Hennessy, 2009). 
However, this unpredictability does not seem to be a characteristic 
inherent to the current crisis; to the contrary, it presents as a 
common factor to the external financial crises that have occurred 
during the globalisation era4.
Therefore, the relation between external financial and monetary 
crises and country risk analysis should be considered to be an area of 
study. In particular, it is important to analyse why despite there 
being so many methods that assess country risk and, therefore, the 
risk of a financial crisis occurring —credit risk ratings, country risk 
indexes, and early warning systems, among others— neither the 
current crisis nor previous globalisation era crises have been 
anticipated. Consequently, more and more experts are questioning 
the effectiveness of the existing methods and their capacity to 
foresee financial and monetary crises in an uncertain environment 
characterised by unpredictability (Goldstein et al., 1998; Oetzel et 
al., 2001; Reinhart, 2002; Gorfinkiel and Lapitz, 2003; De Gregorio, 
2009; Anchuelo and García, 2009; Fernández de Lis and Ontiveros, 
2009; Demyanyk and Hasan, 2010; McAleer et al., 2010), and they 
are advocating new and improved techniques (Danielsson, 2008; 
White, 2008; Girón and Chapoy, 2009).
The present paper follows this line of research. Based on the 
renewed interest driven by the current global episode, the approach 
chosen is to focus on the external financial crises that occurred 
between 1994 and 2002, so-called ‘globalisation era crises’. This is 
in order to check whether during that period, the most used and 
best-known country risk indexes —the mixed type indexes 
published by the Euromoney magazine and by the Political Risk 
Services (PRS) group (i.e. the ICRG)— were capable of discriminating 
beforehand between the countries in crisis and the countries that 
3 One of the first and most comprehensive tests of the relationship between economic 
cycles and the outbreak of crises is the Minsky model, widely covered in Kindleberger 
(1978).
4 Crises can be considered to be unpredictable by their very natures to a certain 
degree, because they have unique characteristics. Thus, there is a long tradition in the 
economics literature of studying efforts to anticipate these crises, such as analysing 
economic cycles and their relationships with the emergence of imbalances and 
vulnerabilities. The First Generation models (Krugman, 1979; Flood et al., 1996), in the 
analysis of external financial crises, conceptualise them as unavoidable and foreseeable 
in an economy that shows a constant deterioration in its fundamentals.
belonging to the same ‘country risk group’ did not develop crisis 
episodes.
3. Hypotheses and Methodology
3.1 Country Risk Indexes
Of the existing methods to assess country risk, country risk 
indexes are possibly the most widespread (Rodríguez and San 
Martín, 2011). They are used to rank countries according to their 
greater or lower levels of risk. There are different types of indexes, 
but the majority of agencies publish indexes that consist of the sum 
by subjectively weighting certain variables for a reference period. 
The majority are also mixed type because they include observational 
and opinion (subjective), which enables them to analyse both 
historical and objective data as well as the appraisals of the experts 
involved in the consultation (Bascomb, 1993; Gorfinkiel and Lapitz, 
2003).
As has already been indicated, two mixed country risk indexes 
were selected for the purpose of this study: the index published by 
the Euromoney magazine and the ICRG. There are various reasons 
for this choice: they are the most widespread and best known in 
international financial circles and both include variables that 
synthesise the information collected using other methods, such as 
the sovereign ratings prepared by major international agencies 
(Ramacharran, 1999; Iturralde et al., 2010). Furthermore, the fact 
that they are published over a relatively extensive time period and 
use a large sample of countries makes them highly reliable and 
enables certain statistical techniques to be applied to the data that 
they contribute. Their characteristics are considered in detail 
below.
The Euromoney index, which is published half-yearly (in March 
and September), during the selected period consisted of 9 variables 
grouped into three categories of indicators (Gorfinkiel and Lapitz, 
2003; www.euromoney.com): an ‘analytical’ indicator comprising 
two opinion-based variables and seven variables divided between 
the ‘external debt’ and ‘market’ indicators. As shown in Table 1, the 
highest weighting is for the analytical and external debt indicators. 
It can thus be deduced that the assessment of country risk performed 
by this index was mainly based on the subjective opinions of experts 
—contained in the Economic Performance and Political Risk 
variables— and on debt-related measurements5.
5 Today, the methodology used by the index to perform their measurements has varied 
considerably. Specifically, it now contains seven variables (which are subdivided into 
more specific) and has increased the importance of the opinion-based variables. More 
information in www.euromoney.com.
Table 1
Components and weightings of the Euromoney index.
Variable Weighting (%)
Analytical indicators 50
 Economic performance 25
 Political risk 25
External debt indicators 30
 Synthetic indicator 10
 Unpaid or renegotiated debt 10
 Credit ratings 10
Market Indicators 20
 Access to bank lending  5
 Access to short-term finance  5
 Access to capital markets  5
 Access and discount on forfeiting  5
Source: Own preparation using data obtained from www.euromoney.com 
(September 2010).
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The PRS group publishes the ICRG every month. This guide 
contains an individual index for three sub-categories: political risk, 
which is broken down into 12 subjective variables established by a 
group of analysts regarding social and political factors; economic 
risk, whose main objective is to indicate the degree of soundness or 
weakness of an economy; and f inancial risk, which reflects the 
capacity of a country to finance its debt. These final two sub-
indexes each contain f ive variables, scored by means of the 
objective analysis of quantifiable data. In total, the ICRG thus 
consists of 22 variables integrated into the composite index. In 
both indexes, the higher the score obtained by a country, the lower 
its risk is.
3.2. Hypotheses
As has already been stated, the degree of social, political, and 
economic uncertainty associated with the participation of the 
agents in the international market has increased in the past three 
decades to such an extent that the increased dif f iculty in 
measuring and foreseeing the inherent r isks (including, in 
particular, country risk) has emerged as the main concern among 
the financial and economic community (Zopounidis et al., 1998; 
Oetzel et al., 2001; Hoti and McAleer, 2005). Moreover, this concern 
remains despite the existence of instruments, such as the 
aforementioned country risk indexes, that should have a certain 
degree of accuracy when measuring the risk levels of different 
countries.
Given the doubts raised by different authors about the prediction 
capacity of the methods to foresee external financial crises and in 
order to determine that prediction capacity, or lack of it, for the 
indexes chosen, we put forward the following hypotheses:
H1.1: the value immediately prior to the outbreak of the crisis of the 
Euromoney index and its two lags have the capacity to discriminate 
between countries in crisis and countries not in crisis. 
H1.2: the value immediately prior to the outbreak of the crisis of the 
ICRG and its two lags have the capacity to discriminate between 
countries in crisis and countries not in crisis. 
The failure of these hypotheses implies, therefore, that the 
indexes have no discriminating capacity beforehand, namely, that 
by means of their lag values, they do not manage to distinguish 
between countries suffering from a crisis episode and countries not. 
However, this conclusion is not at all definitive. Even though it is 
true that the ‘final’ data of the index are usually valued, this is 
constructed on the weighted sum of a series of variables, which 
really contains the relevant information. Therefore, a comprehensive 
analysis regarding the predictive suitability of the selected indexes 
requires the capacity of their variables to be studied. Therefore, we 
put forward another two hypotheses to complete the analysis as 
follows:
H2.1: the values immediately prior to the outbreak of the crises of the 
most representative variables contained in the Euromoney index and 
its two lags have the capacity to discriminate between countries in 
crisis and countries not in crisis. 
H2.2: the values immediately prior to the outbreak of the crises of the 
most representative variables contained in the ICRG and its two lags 
have the capacity to discriminate between countries in crisis and 
countries not in crisis. 
Failure to comply with these hypotheses implies that the lagged 
values of the most significant variables that the Euromoney index 
contains and/or the variables contained in the ICRG are not capable 
of distinguishing between countries. In the same way as in the 
previous, this incapacity would indicate a priori that the variables 
included in these indexes do not sufficiently predict changes in the 
economic fundamentals that lead to crisis episodes.
Using methodologies that have been applied in previous 
studies (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Fiess, 2003; De 
Smet and Montano, 2004; Canbas et al., 2005; Beckmann et al., 
2006; Iranzo, 2008), a procedure was selected to compare both 
hypotheses, namely, logistic regression analysis. In order to 
compare the signif icance of the function, we used the Wald 
statistics (Uriel and Aldás, 2005). We constructed the function 
based on the forward selection method (Silva and Barroso, 2004). 
Finally, we observed the classification table or confusion matrix 
that provides the logistic regression in order to assess the 
accuracy of the model’s predictions. In order to affirm that the 
effectiveness of the model is acceptable, the correct classification 
of the logistic model must be at least 25% higher than is that 
calculated using the proportional randomness criterion (Hair et 
al., 2005).
Thus, given the high number of variables included in each index, 
if the chosen statistical technique were to be applied directly, 
problems of co-linearity could emerge and distort the result. In 
order to avoid this, the results of a factorial analysis performed by 
San Martín (2010) were used. For each index, this only selects the 
variables that are significant, thereby maintaining a sufficient level 
of independence between them.
Following the analysis, we can draw some conclusions. On one 
hand, if the indexes or the most representative variables contained 
therein effectively discriminate between countries in crisis and 
those not in crisis in the chosen time interval, the previously raised 
doubts about their capacity to foresee economic vulnerabilities 
and, therefore, to anticipate crisis episodes would lose validity. On 
the other hand, the conjectures regarding their low forecasting 
capacity would be corroborated and we could conclude that they 
do not anticipate economic vulnerabilities that lead to crisis 
episodes.
Table 2
Components and weightings of the ICRG index.
Variables Score % Individual 
Index
% Composite 
Index
Political risk 100 100 5
 Government stability 12 12 6
 Socio-economic conditions 12 12 6
 Investment profile 12 12 6
 Internal conflicts 12 12 6
 External conflicts 12 12 6
 Corruption 6 6 3
 Military in politics 6 6 3
 Religious tension 6 6 3
 Law and order 6 6 3
 Ethnic tension 6 6 3
 Democratic accountability 6 6 3
 Quality of the bureaucracy 4 4 2
Economic risk 50 100 25
 GDP per head 5 10 2.5
 Real GDP growth 10 20 5
 Annual inflation rate 10 20 5
 Budget balance as a % of GDP 10 20 5
 Current account balance as a % of GDP 15 30 7.5
Financial risk 50 100 25
 Foreign debt as a % of GDP 10 20 5
 Foreign debt service as a % of the exports  
 of goods and services
10 20 5
 Current account balance as a %  
 of the exports of goods and services
15 30 7.5
 Net international liquidity as months  
 of import cover
5 10 2.5
 Exchange rate stability* 10 20 5
*Exchange rate stability is defined as the fluctuation rate of the value of the local 
currency with respect to the US dollar. In the case of the latter, its fluctuation is mea-
sured in terms of the euro.
Source: Own preparation using data obtained from www.prsgroup.com (Septem-
ber 2010)
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3.3. Sample design
The sample used in this paper included two groups. Thirteen 
countries that during the studied period6, that is, between 1994 and 
2002, experienced an external financial crisis and 50 countries that 
even though they belong to the same ‘risk group’ as the first did not. 
Three countries7 were assessed using both the Euromoney index and 
the ICRG.
Thus, although classifying countries into homogeneous groups 
according to the perception of their country risks is a widely accepted 
assumption in the literature (Zopounidis and Doumpos, 2002; De 
Smet and Montano, 2004; Yim and Mitchell, 2005; Tomic-Plazibat et 
al., 2010) and grants greater consistency to the empirical results from 
a methodological point of view, neither the Euromoney index nor the 
ICRG explicitly offers these groupings. In order to solve this drawback 
and with respect to the countries assessed using the variables 
included in the Euromoney index, we used the results of the study 
conducted by Rodríguez et al. (2006), where the countries are 
classified into risk groups using a cluster analysis and checked using a 
discriminant analysis. In the case of the ICRG, these conglomerates 
were obtained from the cluster analysis performed by San Martín 
(2010)8.
Table 3 sets out the countries in crisis and not in crisis that make 
up the final sample. The ‘t’ date refers to the publication of the index 
immediately prior to the moment when a country defaults or seeks a 
moratorium on its external debt. Should that circumstance not 
occur, the start of the crisis is identified as the renegotiating of the 
debt, serious imbalances in the banking system (banking crisis), 
serious liquidity crisis, or when there is a devaluation of the local 
currency by over 15%.
The selected independent variables to contrast the f irst 
hypothesis are9:
6 This period was selected because it is from the last decade of the twentieth century 
when the crises dramatically reflect the influence of globalization in its onset. In fact, 
many experts call these episodes as “crisis of globalization”, as long as they were a 
direct consequence of inadequate integration into the international market for several 
emerging economies.
7 In principle, the aim was to randomly allocate two countries not in crisis that be-
longed to the same ‘risk group’ to each country in crisis according to Rodríguez et al. 
(2006) and a further two according to the ratings based on the ICRG variables. Howe-
ver, owing to the reduced size of certain groups, that selection could not be compre-
hensively performed. Therefore, only one country from the same risk group according 
to each of the two ratings considered was allocated to a country (Uruguay was selected 
at random).
8 In this case, the results obtained from the cluster analysis of the variables contained 
in the ICRG were validated by carrying out four tests: an ANOVA, a MANOVA, a t test, 
and different non-parametric tests.
9 We can see that there is a time lag with respect to the frequency of available data: Eu-
romoney releases its data in March and September of each year (i.e. half yearly), whereas 
the ICRG facilitates monthly values. The de facto solution to this problem comes from the 
lower Euromoney frequency, and therefore, the data that coincided in time were selec-
ted, namely, the values published by both indexes in March and in September.
• The value of each index at moment ‘t’ associated with each country.
• The value of each index with one and two lags with respect to 
moment ‘t’ (i.e. the value at ‘t-1’ and ‘t-2’).
• The difference between the value of the index at ‘t’ and its lags.
In order to contrast the second hypothesis, the value will be used of 
the most significant variables contained in each of the indexes, both at 
moment ‘t’ and with one and two lags10. For both cases, the expounded 
variable takes a value of one for the group of countries in crisis and zero 
otherwise. 
4. Results
4.1. Euromoney Index
Logistic Regression Analysis of the Value of the Euromoney Index
The statistics in Table 4 and the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic (0.64) 
indicate that the quality of global fit is adequate. Taking the results of 
previous studies into account, the logistic regression analysis was 
performed by means of the forward selection method, which, 
stopped in the first step, obtains the following model that includes a 
single variable, namely, the value of the index with two lag periods:
P(Crisis) = 
e–3.656+0.044 Euromoney_t-2
 1 + e–3.656+0.044 Euromoney_t-2
Pursuant to the value of the Wald statistics, the variable is 
significant (individually) enough to establish differences between 
the sample groups. However, its sign is not congruent. With b 
positive and eb>1, an increase in the value of the index with two half-
yearly lags —that is, one year prior to date ‘t’— implies a greater 
probability of belonging to group 1, namely, to the group of countries 
in crisis. This contradicts previous approaches, because a high value 
for the index denotes lower country risk and, in theory, a lower 
probability of suffering a crisis. Table 5 summarises the statistics for 
the variable included in the function.
Table 4
Odds Ratio, Cox and Snell R2, and Nagelkerke R2.
Step –2 odds log Cox and Snell R2 Nagelkerke R2
1 58.427 0.087 0.136
Table 5
Variables in the equation.
Step 1 B E.T. Wald gl Sig. Exp(B)
Euromoney_t-2  0.044 0.020 5.050 1 0.025 1.045
Constant –3.656 1.143 10.231 1 0.001 0.026
10 In order for the total number of independent variables not to be excessive, the 
differences between the value of the variables and their lags were not considered.
Table 3
Final sample of countries in crisis and not in crisis.
Countries in crisis Countries not in crisis
Country Date broke out ‘t’ date Same group according to ICRG variables Same group according to Euromoney variables
Mexico December 1993 Sept. 1993 Cameroon Algeria Nicaragua Bulgaria
Venezuela June 1994 March 1994 Syria Zambia Vietnam Peru
Rumania Halfway through 1996 March 1996 Bolivia Guyana Papua Paraguay
Thailand July 1997 March 1997 Trinidad and Tobago Israel Philippines Poland
Malaysia July 1997 March 1997 Libya Kenya India Sudan
Indonesia August 1997 March 1997 Iran Honduras Czech Republic Egypt
South Korea November 1997 Sept. 1997 Saudi Arabia Jamaica Greece Hungary
Russia August 1998 March 1998 Dem. Rep. Congo Angola Gambia Morocco
Brazil January 1999 Sept. 1998 Oman Malta Colombia Panama
Ecuador August 1999 March 1999 Gabon Nigeria El Salvador Ethiopia
Turkey November 2000 Sept. 2000 Latvia Lithuania Slovakian Rep. South Africa
Argentina December 2001 Sept. 2001 Croatia Estonia Chile China
Uruguay July 2002 March 2002 Zimbabwe — Tunisia —
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With respect to the ratings results11, if the global percentage of 
success achieved by the model (82.5%) were to be compared with 
what would be obtained by applying the proportional randomness 
criterion (67.24%), the success increase in the classification would be 
lower than would the minimum stipulated for the ratings capacity 
of the regression function to be considered significant. Furthermore, 
the classification error only occurs in countries in crisis12. Therefore, 
sub-hypothesis H1.1 is rejected.
Logistic Regression Analysis of the Value of the Most Representative 
Variables
The results of the factor analysis performed by San Martín (2010) 
identify the political risk and unpaid or renegotiated debt13 as more 
representative within the Euromoney index. Based on these results, 
the logistic regression analysis was applied to six independent 
variables: the values of both variables at moment ‘t’ associated with 
each country and their values with one and two lags with respect to 
moment ‘t’14.
First, the total sample was divided into two groups, randomly 
taking 90.5% of the observations (57) for the analysis sample and 
using the other countries (six) in order to validate the results. Using 
the results of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test and the statistics contained 
in Table 6, we confirmed that the quality of global fit is appropriate15.
Table 6
Odds Ratio, Cox and Snell R2, and Nagelkerke R2.
Step –2 odds log Cox and Snell R2 Nagelkerke R2
1 54,225 0.075 0.117
2 44,558 0.219 0.341
As can be seen, the logistic regression model only includes the 
value of political risk at the approximate moment of the outbreak of 
each crisis episode, and the datum of that same variable with 12 
months’ lag.
P(Crisis) = 
e–3,690+20,523PR_t-2 – 16,374PR_t
 1 + e–3.690+20,523PR_t-2 – 16,374PR_t
Table 7 sets out the statistics of each variable.
Table 7
Variables in the equation.
Step 2 B E.T. Wald gl Sig. Exp(B)
PR_t-2  20.523 6.552 9.810 1 0.002 818131286.230
PR_t –16.374 5.887 7.736 1 0.005           0.000
Constant – 3.690 1.328 7.719 1 0.005           0.025
In accordance with the p-values of the Wald statistics, both 
variables are individually significant enough to discriminate 
between the selected groups. Thus, the interpretation of the signs of 
the estimated coefficients differs according to the variable. On one 
hand, with negative b and eb<1, the PR_t variable has a lower value in 
the countries in crisis, which is coherent both with the data and 
with the previous hypothesis. On the other hand, however, the 
positive coefficient and an odds ratio greater than the unit of 
the PR_t–2 variable do not seem reasonable, because they indicate 
11 In the analysis of the values of both indexes, validation samples could not be ex-
tracted because, when doing so, the analysis sample did not provide sufficiently con-
clusive results.
12 Only Malaysia and South Korea were correctly rated by function.
13 This result concurs with the one obtained by Ayala et al. (2000).
14 Even though the variables as such have little correlation —because they were ob-
tained from the factorial analysis— there is co-linearity among the lags. However, we 
deemed that, even so, they can be used for the logistic regression analysis, because we 
do not seek to obtain a model with the maximum discriminating capacity, but rather 
one that has the maximum ratings capacity.
15 With a significance of 1% in both cases.
that this has greater value in the countries in crisis and, as has 
already been mentioned, the contrary should be true. This result 
might be because of the correlation existing between PR_t–2 and 
PR_t. Because co-linearity exists between the variables, their signs 
may show contradictory significance in the function, and in this 
case, the negative effect of PR_t seems to be offset by the positive 
effect of the PR_t–2 variable.
With regard to the capacity of the model to rank the cases 
observed accurately, and taking the proportional random criterion 
as a reference, the success increase in the ratings achieved for the 
analysis sample is 19.24% and 11.08% for the validation sample. In 
both cases, this does not exceed the stipulated minimum increase 
to be able to ensure that the regression function is capable of rating 
correctly. Even though it is true that the percentage of hits in the 
case of the countries not in crisis is high, this is considerably 
reduced when it comes to rating the countries in crisis accurately, 
which are, in general, those that are of interest for us to identify16. 
Based on these results, the H2.1 sub-hypothesis should also be 
rejected.
4.2. ICRG
Logistic Regression Analysis of the Value of the ICRG Index
Following the same procedure, a logistic regression analysis 
was performed on the sample of 63 countries using the ICRG data 
and the process showed no results17. In other words, no logistic 
function is capable of discriminating between countries that will 
develop a crisis episode and countries that have similar financial, 
economic, and political characteristics, but are not in crisis. This 
solution should enable the H1.2 sub-hypothesis to be rejected 
definitively.
Logistic Regression Analysis of the Value of the Most Representative 
Variables
In this case, the factorial analysis extracted four factors and the 
most correlated variables in each case are the current account 
balance as a percentage of GDP; GDP per head; the exchange rate 
stability variable; and the budget balance as a percentage of GDP. 
Thus, taking the value at moment ‘t’ of each of them and their 
respective two lags, we have 12 variables. The sample was divided 
randomly into two groups: the analysis sample, formed by 55 
countries (87.3%), and the other 8 countries that make up the 
validation sample.
The statistics that contrast the quality of the final tuning of the 
model show that the available data make feasible the application of 
a logistic regression analysis, which is here completed in two steps. 
The resulting model includes two variables: the value of GDP per 
head with a delay of 12 months with respect to moment ‘t’ and the 
depreciation rate at moment ‘t’. 
P(Crisis) = 
e–2.897+0.083PIB_perhead_t-2 – 0.038 Exchange_t
 1 + e–2.897+0.083 PIB_perhead_t-2 – 0.038 Exchange_t
The data in the function of both variables are summarised in 
Table 8.
16 Specifically, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and 
Venezuela are appropriately classified.
17 The same procedure was performed by means of the RV contrast and the results 
likewise show the non-existence of an appropriate logistic function. Therefore, and 
taking into account that one of the drawbacks of the method is the possibility of 
excluding variables from the regression that, either theoretically or conceptually, are 
important, the analysis was again performed using the introduce method (formed 
based on each of the selected independent variables) to definitively confirm that the 
inconsistent results of the logistic regression are not because of the modelling method 
used. 
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Although the function does not offer a logical interpretation, the 
coefficients indicate an inconsistent relation and this is contrary to 
previous assumptions. With respect to the predictive capacity of the 
model, as the confusion matrix shows, this has a low percentage of 
success, both for the analysis sample and for the validation18. In fact, 
when the results obtained in both are included, only Ecuador, Russia, 
Turkey, and Venezuela are correctly rated. These results show that 
the H2.2 sub-hypothesis can also be rejected.
4.3. Synthesis of the Results
The logistic regression analyses performed on the values of the 
selected indexes and of their most significant variables do not show 
the appropriate results. The regression functions obtained show, in 
all cases19, coefficients that are difficult to interpret and inconsistent 
with previous assumptions. Furthermore, as shown by the results 
summarised in Table 9, these functions have little classification 
power, erring mainly on the forecast of the most interesting cases to 
be detected, that is, the countries in crisis.
Table 9
Summary of the ratings results
Index Value 
analysed
Hits in the 
analysis 
sample (%)
Hits in the 
validation 
sample (%)
Total number of hits in 
the ratings of countries 
in crisis
Euromoney Index 82.5% ∅ 2
Variables 86.0% 83.0% 7
ICRG Index ∅ ∅ ∅
Variables 81.8% 87.5% 4
In light of the foregoing, we reject the H1 and H2 hypotheses, 
because it seems proven that the values of the Euromoney index and 
of the ICRG, along with those of their most representative variables, 
are not capable of discriminating, within the sample selected, 
between the cases identified as countries in crisis and those not.
5. Conclusions
Although the current international financial crisis has certain 
unique characteristics among the factors that underpinned its 
outbreak, it shares some processes similar to previous crises that 
have occurred in the globalisation era, particularly from 1994 
onwards. One of these characteristics is its unpredictability. As 
demonstrated in the present paper, efficient instruments still do not 
seem to exist that can forecast in advance the form, the moment, or 
the place of its outbreak. Corroborating this statement, the results 
described herein indicate that both the Euromoney index and the 
ICRG, along with their most representative variables, are incapable 
of forecasting with sufficient notice —in the medium term— the 
financial, economic, and/or political vulnerabilities that can trigger 
18 Only the validation sample seems to achieve a sufficient hit percentage (with an 
effectiveness indicator higher than the random criterion of around 25%) in order for the 
classification to be taken to be adequate. However, for this matrix, the hit percentage 
is only 50% for the group of countries in crisis, which is very poor. Furthermore, this 
result might be inconsistent because of the reduced number of observations in the 
validation sample.
19 Except for the analysis performed on the value of the ICRG, where no result was 
obtained.
a crisis. Furthermore, this incapacity is particularly relevant insofar 
as the two selected indexes for the present analysis are the best 
known and most widely used by the international f inancial 
community.
Considering the results achieved and taking into account that 
this unpredictability seems to be a common factor to ‘globalisation 
era’ crises, we have reached some conclusions.
First of all we come to the main conclusion that the Euromoney 
and ICRG indexes,  a long with the var iables with greater 
representation within them, do not foresee —in the medium term— 
the negative changes or vulnerabilities that emerge in a specific 
economy, which can lead to episodes of external crises. Although the 
results are not favourable to the acceptance of the presented 
hypotheses, they imply that the Euromoney index and its significant 
variables have a greater discriminating capacity and greater hit rate 
in terms of classification compared with the ICRG and its variables, 
even though its coefficients must be interpreted in the opposite way 
to that expected. But, in any event, these results do not imply that 
the selected indexes are unusable. First, the Euromoney and ICRG 
indexes are both acceptable for markets and analysts to reflect on 
the perceived risk of a country insofar as they include a series of 
variables that consider the opinions of different experts regarding 
country risk. Second, despite the ongoing criticism of their inability 
to forecast accurately, they continue to have a great degree of 
widespread acceptance in financial markets and they are consulted 
by numerous companies as well as individual and institutional 
investors.
Lastly, we have observed that the growing interrelation, 
integration, and globalisation of financial markets has increased their 
degree of complexity and, likewise, their instability, meaning that risk 
management has become the main area of interest of the international 
community. Therefore, in this new global economic framework, there 
is no room for the ‘easy prediction’ assumption of crisis episodes. 
Quite to the contrary, it seems to be necessary to develop new 
methods that, from the prism of uncertainty and unpredictability, 
measure and manage country risk in the most appropriate way.
In this context, and taking into account the aforementioned 
consequences arising from an increasingly globalized environment, 
we estimate a new approach to country risk is essential.
That is, given that the absolute control of risk seems to be 
impossible, it needs to be anticipated ab initio by identifying its 
sources and investigating its underlying causes. Therefore, 
controlling the evolution of less sustainable economic phenomena 
would thus be necessary by leaving forecasting models to one side 
and focusing attention on the potentially unfolding scenarios of an 
economic system marked by uncertainty and unpredictability.
Finally, we discuss the limitations found that, in general, have 
been with respect to the sample of selected countries. First, the final 
sample that has been prepared, that is, assessments issued by 
Euromoney and ICRG indexes, for a given time period (between 1994 
and 2002) and for a set of countries, has been reduced. The reason is 
the small number of countries that during the selected period 
suffered an episode of crisis. In fact, not to unbalance the equilibrium 
between countries and, therefore, to prevent biased results, we 
could not expand the number of cases in the final sample. Also, the 
type of sample data has enabled the application of certain statistical 
techniques that otherwise would have been of particular interest 
(e.g. panel data).
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